Is a "Feminine" Ethic Enough? by Wilson, Leslie
Atlantis Vol. 13 No.2 
Spring!Pnntemps 1988 
Is a "Feminine" 
Ethic Enough? Leslie Wilson 
University of Western Ontario 
A B S T R A C T 
One aspect of the feminine which has received much attention in recent nontraditional ethical theory (most notably in Nel Noddings' Caring) is the 
feminine practice of caring for others. The ability of the caring person to "receive" or "pay attention to" the reality of another in order to "feel with" that 
other is commonly presented as the most crucial ingredient to the caring relation. I argue that however imporant this caring attitude is to ethical 
relations, an ethics which focuses almost entirely on it is not enough to set us on the path to a moral society if applied within the oppressive social system 
of patriarchy. A feminist re-vision of this notion of caring is needed to ensure that the care women give to others does not contribute to sustaining 
patriarchal relations, and that women, too, receive care (from themselves, other women, and men). I offer a vision of such a feminist ethics of caring. 
R E S U M E 
U n des aspects du feminin sur lequel les theories ethiques non-traditionnelles se sont beaucoup penchees recemmeni (notamment dans Caring, de Nel 
Noddings) est celui de la pratique femininede "bienveillance" en vers son prochain. L'elcmenl principal des rapports entre la person ne qui montrecette 
"bienveillance" et la personne qui la recoit est le fait que la premiere soit capable de "capter" la realitedc 1'autre, d'y "preter attention," afin de pouvoir 
"ressentir" les emotions de cette autre personne. Je soutiens cependant que, bien que cette attitude de "bienveillance" soit tres importante dans les 
relations ethiques, line ethique qui en dependrait presque exclusivement ne suffirait pas a nous mettre sur la voie d'une societe morale si elle etait 
pratiquee dans le cadre du systeme social oppressif du patriarcat. II est indispensable de proceder a une re-vision feministre de cette notion de 
"bienveillance," afin d'assurer que cette bienveillance que les femmes portent a leur prochain ne contribue pas a entretenir des relations patriarcales. 
Les femmes, ellesaussi, sont des etres qui seconcilient la bienveillance d'avitrui (d'elles-memes, d'autres femmes, et deshommes). Je propose une vision 
d'une telle "ethique de bienveillance feminis/e." 
M u c h has been written on the inadequacy of traditional 
ethical theory. 1 It is not my intent ion to review that litera-
ture here, except to say that the inadequacy of traditional 
ethical theory is c o m m o n l y , and I th ink correctly, attrib-
uted to the predominance of the " m a s c u l i n e " perspective 
i n such theory. Crit ics of tradit ional ethical theory suggest 
that the emphasis on masculine values—such as those of 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m , impart ia l i ty , reason " p u r i f i e d " of emo-
tion, and the universal appl icat ion of abstract principles 
and laws—results i n the failure of traditional ethical the-
ory to speak to (i.e., capture the experience of) many 
h u m a n beings, especially women. Crit ics point out that 
traditional theorists locate the failure not i n their theory 
but i n the persons for w h o m their theory does not speak, 
w i t h the result that such persons are viewed by traditional 
theorists as either i m m o r a l , or moral ly stagnated, or 
s imply n o n m o r a l 2 . Crit ics of traditional ethical theory 
further reveal that such theory is of l imited applicabi l i ty to 
many of us because it is f i rmly rooted i n abstract principles 
w h i c h are too r i g i d to accommodate the complexity of 
real-life situations. T h e obsession w i t h h o l d i n g to such 
principles, come what may, often has moral ly repugnant 
consequences. T r a d i t i o n a l ethical theory involves the 
perpetual risk of p l a c i n g pr inc iple before person, of 
a l l o w i n g the sacrifice of person(s) for the sheer preserva-
tion of the rule/theory. 3 
Clearly, there is no mystery as to why moral theory, 
indeed most theory, has, u n t i l recently, been dominated by 
the masculine perspective. T h e reason is, quite s imply, 
that those w h o have had the power and freedom to theorize 
(and to decide what should count as acceptable theory) 
have been p r i m a r i l y men, and it is p r i m a r i l y men w h o 
embrace masculine values. Feminists have l o n g argued 
that the divis ion between masculine and feminine values/ 
perspectives is to a large degree both a product and a 
perpetuator of patriarchal social relations. T r a d i t i o n a l 
(masculine) theory—whether it be epistemological, scien-
tific or ethical—has served to both reflect and perpetuate 
the under ly ing social reality of patriarchy. For this reason 
the various sorts of theories are a l l interconnected and are 
i n an important sense pol i t i ca l : each being fueled by the 
value system w h i c h serves as the foundat ion of patriarchy. 
Those ethical theories w h i c h may properly be called 
feminine ethical theories value the characteristics and 
qualities typically construed as feminine (and, hence, typ-
ically found i n women), a long w i t h the part icular ways of 
relating to others w h i c h are facilitated by these qualities. 
Feminine ethical theories advocate that such qualities and 
ways of relating form the foundat ion of m o r a l theory. It is 
understandable that, i n the attempt to formulate a moral 
theory w h i c h w o u l d be a suitable alternative to or dis-
placement for traditional masculine moral theory, we 
w o u l d look to the feminine values and experience of real-
ity. After a l l , t radit ional mora l theory has neglected, even 
eschewed, values typically construed as feminine (for 
instance, values ar is ing from the ability to empathize 
w i t h , and the wi l l ingness to trust and cooperate w i t h 
others), and this neglect accounts for m u c h of what is 
w r o n g w i t h tradit ional theory. In ex to l l ing the feminine, 
we must be careful not to endorse the d iv is ion between the 
masculine and the feminine i n such a way as to perpetuate 
patriarchal social arrangements. A n y ethical theory rooted 
i n the feminine must be cautious of this. It w i l l not suffice 
to say that, by c a l l i n g a theory feminine one does not mean 
to i m p l y that a l l and o n l y women can have access to it, if 
one then proceeds to apply it to a social reality wherein 
most women and few men are required to develop the 
capacities, dispositions, attitudes, desires, and relations 
necessary to w o r k i n g w i t h the ethic in question. In formu-
la t ing a feminine ethical theory we must remain informed 
by the " p o l i t i c s of our real i ty ." We must ask questions 
such as, " W i l l this ethical theory work (i.e., w i l l it enable 
h u m a n beings to interact i n non-oppressive ways)?," 
" W i l l it work for women?, " or "Is a ' feminine ' ethic 
enough?." 
M y feeling is that a l though a feminine ethical theory 
might wel l be " e n o u g h " i n an ideal society, and, a l though 
the formula t ion of a feminine ethic is undoubtedly a step 
towards a mora l society, such an ethic is not enough 
w i t h i n our part icular social context of patriarchy. If a 
feminine ethic is to set us securely on the path to a moral 
society, and if it is to give birth to a moral/pol i tical climate 
w h i c h does not reinforce the subordination of women to 
men, it must undergo specifically feminist ta i lor ing. It 
must become, for a time, a feminist ethic. 
O n e aspect of the feminine w h i c h has received m u c h 
attention in recent nontradi t ional ethical theory, and 
w h i c h I shal l focus o n here, is the feminine practice of 
" c a r i n g ' ' for others. T h i s not ion raises immediate concern 
for feminists, for the role of women as carer and nurturer 
of others is fundamental to the patriarchal def ini t ion of 
w o m a n . W i l l focussing o n qualities w h i c h women possess 
by virtue of being subordinate to men, serve to further 
their subordination? T h e answer to this w i l l no doubt 
depend on how one construes caring. There are various 
theories as to just what this feminine car ing involves. Does 
it, for instance, involve the complete loss of self as women 
w i t h i n patriarchy are accustomed to achieving? Perhaps 
the most extensive account of the not ion of car ing is that 
provided by N e l N o d d i n g s i n her book Caring. Noddings ' 
theory is, as she herself acknowledges, a feminine ethic 
and not a feminist ethic. I w i l l suggest that it, l ike a l l 
feminine ethical theories, is inadequate w i t h i n patriarchy 
insofar as it is compatible wi th patriarchal relations 
between women and men. Nevertheless, there are many 
aspects of Noddings ' account of car ing w h i c h I f i n d 
ins ightful and p r o m i s i n g for they readily lend themselves 
to feminist re-vision. 
In what fol lows, I present a vis ion of, at least, part of a 
feminist ethic of car ing w h i c h draws f rom a few of the 
more general insights of Noddings. One such insight is 
her c la im that morality is rooted i n h u m a n relations i n 
general and i n the caring relation i n particular, and that 
the ethic of caring is feminine in the m i n i m a l sense of 
being "rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and reponsive-
ness" 4 . I wish to retain this g r o u n d i n g for moral i ty , but I 
suggest that such relatedness, receptivity, and responsive-
ness be viewed and defined i n l ight of the broader social 
and pol i t ica l context of w h i c h they are a part. As we shall 
see, this w i l l alter the concept of "ethical c a r i n g " so that it 
differs from N o d d i n g s ' account; i.e., it w i l l alter what w i l l 
count as ethically significant relatedness, receptivity, and 
responsiveness. W h i l e this feminist ethic w i l l have impor-
tant pol i t ica l implicat ions for relations w i t h i n and a m o n g 
oppressed groups i n general, I am here pr imar i ly con-
cerned w i t h the implicat ions it has for women. 
By rooting morali ty in h u m a n relatedness, Noddings 
singles out a certain sort of caring relation as ethically 
significant. T h e ethical ideal i n N o d d i n g s ' view is to 
create, mainta in , and enhance this caring relation: to 
become, and to aid others i n becoming, the sorts of i n d i -
viduals w h o can partake i n relations wherein genuine 
ethical caring can thrive. Insofar as relations exemplify 
this, they are ethical. S imi lar ly , the actions of individuals 
are ethical insofar as they are born of this ideal, insofar as 
they are the product of individuals motivated by this ideal. 
More specifically, i n Noddings ' view, the caring relation 
holds between two individuals : the "one-car ing" and the 
"cared-for," each of w h o m must meet certain conditions. 
T h e one-caring must possess a certain state of conscious-
ness (the caring attitude) characterized by receptivity and 
the abi l i ty to "engross" oneself in another. T h i s car ing 
attitude is presented and developed by Noddings as the 
most crucial ingredient to the car ing relation. Neverthe-
less, in order for the car ing of the one-caring to be com-
pleted, the cared-for must respond i n the appropriate 
manner to the one-caring's caring. 
T h i s is the general framework presented by Noddings 
w h i c h I wish to retain. F r o m w i t h i n it, I wish to expand 
somewhat upon the notions of relatedness, receptivity i n 
the one-caring, and responsiveness of the cared-for, i n 
ways not adequately considered by Noddings . 
I have p r i m a r i l y two things to say w i t h regard to the 
not ion of h u m a n relatedness, both in its general and in its 
specific form of caring. First, it is doubtful that there is any 
such th ing as a pure caring relation. C a r i n g relations 
usually occur w i t h i n the context of other relations, and 
these pr ior relations affect the nature of the caring rela-
t ion. We should keep this i n m i n d when speaking of the 
car ing relation. Second, not a l l pr ior relations, and s im-
i lar ly , not a l l ca r ing relations are mere givens. T h a t is, 
contrary to what Noddings often implies , it is not always 
the case that we merely f ind ourselves related to particular 
others towards w h o m we must then develop the caring 
attitude. 
If it is true that the caring relation is seldom, if ever, the 
first or sole relation formed between people, then it is 
l ikely that where pr ior relations exist, these relations w i l l 
give varying faces to the car ing relation. Indeed, it usually 
is the case that people are brought together through some 
other relation first (e.g., teacher and p u p i l , mother and 
child) w h i c h then either becomes a caring relation as wel l 
(one-caring and cared-for), or does not. I suggest that such 
prior relations influence the caring relation by p lac ing 
conditions on the type of feelings the one-caring should be 
receptive to, and on the type of response w h i c h should be 
expected from the cared-for. 
Lovers, for instance, care and are attentive to each other 
i n different ways than are friends w h o are not lovers. 
Different friendships form around the attention to/recep-
t ion of different feelings/thoughts/interests. Different 
sorts of friendships require different degrees of engross-
ment. In a l l of these relations mutual i ty ( in the relevant 
respects) seems both attainable and desirable (though it 
may be neither i n other relations). If I spend time a n d 
energy engrossed i n my friend, i n feeling-with her, then, if 
she is capable and the opportunity arises, I should be able 
to depend on her engrossment i n me. Indeed, if time wears 
on and I continue to behave as a one-caring-friend towards 
her, and yet she devotes no such energy towards me, I may 
feel exhausted and short-changed. If my car ing for my 
friend fosters the more general car ing attitude i n her, this 
pleases me, but this is not enough. I need her to respond as 
one-caring-friend towards me. I feel warranted i n demand-
i n g mutual i ty here, and if my friend, a l though capable, 
continues to lack any interest i n caring-as-friend for me, I 
may feel compelled to withdraw my caring-as-friend for 
her. T h e fr iendship relation has altered what w i l l count as 
successful caring and appropriate response. 
I have referred to pr ior relations w h i c h are considered to 
be purely social, and yet, when these relations occur 
between women and men w i t h i n patriarchy, they become 
pol i t ica l as wel l . That is, w i t h i n patriarchy, relations 
between women and men, especially car ing relations, are 
always pol i t i ca l i n nature. Feminists have provided ade-
quate reason to believe this, especially on the level of 
so-called personal relations, where women and men relate 
as lovers for instance. Furthermore, because patriarchy 
defines w o m a n i n terms of her relation to man, relations 
between women and chi ldren, and between women and 
women, also acquire pol i t ica l significance w i t h i n patri-
archy by virtue of their relation to this other relation. 
Motherhood, for example, is legitimate w i t h i n patriarchy 
only when the c h i l d being mothered is legitimate. S im-
i lar ly , women l o v i n g women w i t h i n patriarchy consti-
tutes a pol i t ica l relation insofar as it constitutes a refusal to 
conform to the patriarchal inst i tution of compulsory heter-
osexuality. T h e condit ions for car ing w i l l be doubly 
affected i n these cases, i n the sense that such pol i t ica l 
factors w i l l help determine the needs, interests, desires, 
etc., of the individuals being cared-for, as wel l as of the 
individuals caring, often i n more fundamental ways than 
purely social pr ior relations do. I w i l l speak more of this as 
it pertains to the requirements of receptivity and respon-
siveness i n the caring relation. 
M y second point w h i c h I mentioned above, is related to 
the first. Briefly, many of these pr ior relations are altera-
ble. Focussing, as N o d d i n g s does, solely o n relations 
between individuals and the type of characteristics/con-
sciousnesses individuals must possess i n order to qual i fy as 
one-caring or cared-for, may cause us to overlook the fact 
that i n d i v i d u a l relations, and i n d i v i d u a l consciousnesses, 
are formed w i t h i n a social context. Such a focus may give 
rise to the impression that people merely f i n d themselves 
i n relation to each other and that, given these relations, the 
task is for the individuals to make them into relations 
wherein ethical car ing can thrive. It suggests a certain 
arbitrariness about w h o m it is that we can/should care for 
and w h o it is that can/should care for us. N o w this is 
patently true for many relations wherein ethical caring 
has the potential to occur. For instance, none of us had a 
say i n w h o our b io logica l parents were, nor i n what com-
m u n i t y we were born and raised. We had no choice, and it 
does seem that there is a certain arbitrariness i n our f ind-
i n g ourselves i n these particular relations. 
Most relations, however, are not arbitrarily determined 
i n this way. For instance, the customs/norms endorsed by 
a society determine (in a non-arbitrary way) many of the 
relations a m o n g people, as wel l as the consciousnesses of 
people. Marxist pol i t i ca l theorists have l o n g pointed out 
h o w differences i n economic class and relation to the 
means of product ion w i t h i n society greatly influence the 
belief systems individuals of varying classes come to hold . 
These varying belief systems both reflect and mainta in the 
divis ions of class. S i m i l a r l y , patriarchal institutions, such 
as compulsory heterosexuality, influence the beliefs women 
(and men) come to h o l d about themselves and their rela-
tions w i t h others. Patriarchal institutions, such as this, are 
a n y t h i n g but arbitrary i n d e f i n i n g relations as they do. 
Rather, relations are so defined for the purpose of main-
t a i n i n g patriarchy. What better way to ensure that women 
remain divided from each other and i n the company of 
men, than to promote an ideology w h i c h portrays women 
as ideally, if not naturally, heterosexual? It is pa in fu l ly 
obvious. 
E q u a l l y obvious is that there is r o o m for reflection as to 
the appropriateness of these social relations, both in them-
selves and as candidates for car ing relations. It may be that 
some of these pr ior relations preclude the possibi l i ty of 
genuine car ing ever occurr ing w i t h i n them. T h i s w o u l d 
be so, for instance, if a pr ior social-poli t ical relation inhib-
ited, or rendered impossible , the abi l i ty of the one-caring 
and the cared-for to receive and respond i n ways conducive 
to enhancing the ethical ideal. If so, then these relations 
w o u l d have to be appropriately altered or perhaps even 
disposed of altogether. Soc ia l -pol i t ica l factors influence 
mora l relations, then, i n the sense that such factors help 
determine who it is we f i n d ourselves next to; what it is we 
th ink we can expect from certain types of indiv iduals , 
i n c l u d i n g ourselves; and what become (and what we per-
ceive to be) the needs and desires of certain individuals . A l l 
feminist ethical theories need to take this into account. 
I contend that the nature of pr ior relations and the 
presence of social factors have at least two impl icat ions for 
the not ion of receptivity i n the one-caring. First, a l though 
the car ing attitude (as Noddings describes it) is necessary 
to the car ing relation, it is not sufficient. T h e car ing 
attitude is not sufficient for the caring relation because 
alone it cannot guarantee that the one-caring w i l l receive/ 
perceive the needs and feelings of the cared-for w h i c h are 
relevant to her car ing for the cared-for i n a particular way 
(i.e., as friend, as lover, as parent, etc.). Some judgment 
and d iscr iminat ion , i n addi t ion to the car ing attitude, is 
required on the part of the one-caring. For example, i n 
order to care successfully as parent (and not as lover) for 
one's c h i l d , a parent must be able to discern w h i c h of the 
chi ld 's feelings and needs are appropriate to receive and 
respond to. S i m i l a r l y so i n cases where relations contain a 
po l i t i ca l element. In such cases, however, the one-caring 
may be ignorant of the relevant social factors and prior 
relations w h i c h influence the particular needs of the 
cared-for. T h i s w i l l mean that al though the one-caring 
cares, she may not care i n the relevant way. Here, the 
one-caring w i l l have to become informed about such polit -
ical factors and their influence on the cared-for i n order to 
care successfully. T h i s point w i l l become clearer later i n 
this discussion. 
T h e second i m p l i c a t i o n w h i c h pr ior relations have for 
the not ion of receptivity in the one-caring is as follows. 
G i v e n that pr ior social relations may affect the caring 
relation and that they may do so negatively, and given that 
such pr ior relations are often alterable, then where they are 
alterable, it seems there is room for the one-caring to be 
selective i n her car ing relations, both i n the sense of select-
i n g the type of care appropriate for a given ind iv idua l , and 
i n selecting the individuals for w h o m to care. Of course, 
such selection must be i n keeping with the ethical ideal. 
Let me elaborate wi th the help of Noddings. 
In Noddings ' view, ethical caring is concerned w i t h 
" h o w to meet the other m o r a l l y " 5 , and to meet the other, 
the one-caring must remain, for a time, in what Noddings 
calls "the receptive mode of consciousness." T h i s con-
sciousness is crucial to determining the ethicality of the 
caring relation. It is at the heart of caring. T h i s state of 
consciousness, "the caring attitude," enables the one-
caring to engross herself i n the other i n order to apprehend 
the reality of the other. It al lows her to lose herself and to 
feel w i t h the other. In apprehending the reality of the 
other, I understand Noddings to mean seeing the other 
person's reality (life, situation, needs, interests, etc.) as that 
person sees and feels it, wi thout i m p o s i n g one's o w n 
judgments u p o n what one receives. The caring attitude 
al lows one to grasp the perspective of another, and i n so 
grasping, the other is confirmed as one who is worth 
having her reality grasped. T h i s feeling w i t h the other is 
frequently enough to motivate one to act on behalf of the 
other, as though on behalf of oneself, but it need not 
necessarily so move us. After one has received the reality of 
the other, Noddings suggests that one may (but, again, 
need not) reflect u p o n it and ask whether endorsing it 
w o u l d indeed be i n keeping w i t h the ethical ideal (i.e., 
w o u l d it enhance the particular caring relation, or the 
abil i ty of the particular persons involved to be car ing i n 
general?). 
T h e car ing attitude, and abil i ty to feel w i t h and to 
conf i rm the other is indeed at the heart of moral i ty as I see 
it. T o see that it is not enough, consider this example. A 
w o m a n is i n front of me. She has been sexually harassed, 
and is relaying her feelings to me. I receive them openly; I 
l isten, and I am attentive to her. I see the distress i n her 
eyes, I feel w i t h her. I possess the car ing attitude, and 
a l though I say noth ing , she senses my concern for her and 
responds appropriately to it. Is this caring of mine, ethical 
caring? Is the fact that I am receiving and c o n f i r m i n g her 
enough to ensure that I care i n the relevant or appropriate 
way (relevant to furthering the ethical ideal)? Is it enough 
that I receive and grasp her reality as she sees it? Can I shed 
my o w n perspective utterly whi le receiving her perspec-
tive? C a n I refrain from m a k i n g judgments even at this 
level? Should I so refrain? 
Suppose that I listen openly, truly feel the distress she is 
feeling, but believe that she is overreacting, and that this 
distress, w h i c h is real, w i l l pass. Suppose sexual harass-
ment is, to me, a means whereby men compliment 
women, it is not truly harmful , though perhaps a n u i -
sance at times. Suppose my concern, w h i c h she senses, 
arises from my perception/fear that she is psychologically 
weak and socially maladjusted. I w i l l be here for her, and 
when the distress subsides, I w i l l recommend a therapist to 
help her deal wi th her problem. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that I listen openly, truly 
feel the distress she is feeling, but believe that she is war-
ranted i n feeling this distress. Suppose that sexual har-
assment is, to me, part of a network of social institutions 
w h i c h oppress women. Suppose my concern, w h i c h she 
senses, arises from my perception that she has suffered a 
grave injustice, as do many women. I w i l l be here for her 
and when her distress, w h i c h is real, subsides, I w i l l tell her 
that there is noth ing about her per se, save her womanness, 
w h i c h led certain others to view such treatment of her as 
acceptable, and that she is neither to blame for it nor 
maladjusted i n feeling distress over it, and that there are 
courses of action w h i c h she may pursue w h i c h may help to 
ensure that her harassor deals w i t h his problem. 
T h e caring attitude exists i n me i n both of these cases, 
yet I suggest that these two instances of meeting the other 
are not equivalent, ethically speaking, and that the second 
instance only is one wherein genuine ethical caring 
occurs. In both of these cases, the w o m a n may either share 
my view of her experience of sexual harassment and the 
val idity of her distress, or not. When can it be said that I 
have grasped her reality? A l t h o u g h feeling w i t h her is 
utterly important, and a l though I feel w i t h her i n both 
cases, only i n the second case do I truly understand her 
reality, whether or not she perceives it to be her reality, 
because only i n this case do I see how it deprives her of a 
sense of self necessary to being a moral/caring person. 
Unders tanding her reality i n this sense is necessary if I am 
to care for her i n the relevant way, i.e., i n keeping w i t h the 
ethical ideal. M y car ing for her i n the first case goes against 
the ethical ideal i n the sense that I contribute to a sense of 
this woman's self compatible wi th her remaining a v ic t im. 
I promote a warped sense of her self, whereas i n the second 
case my car ing for her i n some sense "empowers" her. 6 
Before my car ing takes an active form (before I advise the 
w o m a n as to what course she should seek—therapist or 
sexual harassment committee, for example), I must be able 
to discern what k i n d of cafe she is i n need of. In general, we 
must be able to discern when the ethical selves of women 
are being thwarted and where ethical caring is needed. 
Whether or not we can discern w i l l be determined i n part 
by our o w n beliefs and wor ld view. In an important sense 
judgments cannot be put on h o l d u n t i l after we have 
received the other's perspective. Even if we may refrain 
from m a k i n g judgments w h i l e receiving, our o w n per-
spective predetermines to some extent what we w i l l receive. 
In both instances, my view of sexual harassment colored 
the feelings I received from this woman, even though I felt 
w i t h her i n both cases. If this is plausible, then it w i l l be 
important to be aware of how our o w n perspective i n f l u -
ences what we receive and, s imi lar ly , it w i l l be important 
to reflect on the accuracy of our perspective. Feminist analy-
sis, as opposed to other pol i t ica l analyses, of social p o l i t i -
cal relations, al lows us to recognize the needs of ind iv idua l 
women w h i c h they have by virtue of being a member of a 
group or class w h i c h is oppressed by some other group or 
class, recognition w h i c h a focus o n individuals alone w i l l 
not afford us. Feminist analysis enables us to perceive 
where the ethical selves of women are thwarted. Clearly, 
the consciousnesses of those w h o care, must be raised. 
Perhaps the example chosen is one w h i c h too easily 
makes the necessity of a consciousness informed by femi-
nist analysis seem necessary. Social/polit ical factors i n f l u -
ence w o m e n i n more subtle ways. If the w o m a n i n my 
example had not relayed her experience of being sexually 
harassed, but rather, was expressing to me her difficulties 
w i t h speaking in public , her general lack of self-confidence, 
or her love-hate feelings for her chi ldren, a feminist con-
sciousness i n the one-caring w o u l d be equally as necessary 
to perceiving the reality of this woman. Regardless of 
whether I care for this w o m a n as w o u l d a friend, a mother, 
a therapist (or a l l of these), awareness of how social factors 
contribute i n a fundamental way to her self-concept, her 
reality, and her feelings and, most importantly, awareness 
of how this is oppressive to her, w o u l d be crucia l i n 
c o n f i r m i n g her, i n nur tur ing her ethical self—in caring 
for her. 
W h a t of the not ion of responsiveness? A l t h o u g h N o d -
dings roots morality pr imar i ly i n the "pre-act conscious-
ness of the one-car ing , " an absence of an appropriate 
response o n the part of the cared-for w i l l n u l l i f y the ethi-
cality of the car ing relation. Indeed, according to N o d -
dings, it w i l l n u l l i f y the ethicality of the one-caring's 
car ing. I agree w i t h Noddings that the response of the 
cared-for should play an important role i n determining 
the completeness of the car ing relation. However, I stress 
the importance of the response of the cared-for i n a differ-
ent way: as it pertains to determining responsibility for the 
success/completeness of certain caring relations. 
A l t h o u g h Noddings acknowledges that there are a 
range of responses w h i c h cared-fors may give, she does not 
consider that the appropriateness of a given response 
should to a large degree depend on the nature of the 
i n d i v i d u a l cared-for. I recommend that we consider the 
type of response it is/ought to be w i t h i n the capacity of the 
cared-for to evidence, as wel l as other factors un ique to 
part icular relations wherein the car ing relation holds, 
before we judge whether or not a particular response is 
appropriate. T o repeat, pr ior relations of fr iendship, or 
whatever, w i l l help determine what response should be 
deemed appropriate i n a car ing relation. In some cases, 
this w i l l a l low us to h o l d the cared-for equally as respon-
sible for the success/failure of the car ing relation as the 
one-caring. T h e earlier example regarding mutual i ty 
w i t h i n some friendships, may be elucidating here. It seems 
reasonable to believe that if there is every reason to expect 
that my friend is capable of caring-as-friend for me, and 
yet she does not, then the failure of that friendship is at 
least partly her responsibility. O n the other hand, if, due to 
immatur i ty , i l lness or other factors, the cared-for is not 
capable of responding i n the expected way, the car ing 
relation may be successful nevertheless. 
Noddings does describe several different appropriate 
responses. One such response occurs when the care and 
attention the one-caring gives to the cared-for results i n the 
cared-for's development of the car ing attitude and the 
abi l i ty to be one-caring (i.e., the response of the cared-for 
becomes a matter of the cared-for c o m i n g to possess the 
car ing attitude herself). Other appropriate responses con-
sist of something quite m i n i m a l , a l o n g the lines of the 
recognition of the car ing attitude i n the one-caring, or 
even more m i n i m a l l y , i n the abi l i ty of the cared-for to 
attain a state of being w h i c h is conducive to the "free 
pursuit of her projects." 
T h e cared-for is free to be more ful ly himself i n the 
car ing relation. Indeed, this being himself, this w i l l -
i n g and unselfconscious revealing of self, is his 
major contribution to the relation. 7 
One further response of the cared-for might be to 
respond i n k i n d , i.e., not only does the cared-for become a 
one-caring, he becomes a one-caring towards the one car-
i n g for h i m . In Noddings ' view this mutual i ty is not 
necessary to the caring relation. A l t h o u g h at least one of 
these responses is required, i n Noddings ' view, any one of 
them, regardless of the type of caring relation, w i l l be 
sufficiently appropriate and w i l l render the car ing rela-
tion complete. I believe this is where Noddings is mistaken. 
T h o u g h I shal l not argue this here, I believe that a 
feminist ethic of caring should enable us to care for 
members of species other than our own, and that we must 
be careful not to make it solely a matter of def init ion 
whether other animals can respond to our caring in the 
appropriate way. A t any rate, my concern here is w i t h the 
responses of h u m a n cared-fors. Contrary to Noddings , 1 
believe that i n caring for certain members of our species, 
such as the very young, the very i l l , the very aged, and so 
on , the m i n i m a l response, as described above, f rom the 
cared-for should be acceptable to render the car ing com-
plete. Indeed, sometimes a complete lack of response 
might be acceptable as wel l if, for instance, one is caring 
for a terminally i l l comatose relative. 8 A g a i n , I suggest that 
we j udge the appropriateness of a response on the grounds 
of what is reasonable to expect from the i n d i v i d u a l being 
cared-for, a long w i t h what should be expected from such 
an i n d i v i d u a l given the nature of the caring relation at 
hand. Neither of the m i n i m a l responses should be regarded 
as sufficient, for instance, if the cared-for is an adult, 
perfectly healthy, and w i l l i n g l y partaking i n a relation-
ship i n v o l v i n g caring. 
C a r i n g relations of this latter sort w h i c h occur w i t h i n 
friendships or love relations between women and men, are 
of pr imary concern to feminists. W o m e n are often the 
emotional glue of the fami ly—tending to the needs and 
desires of others whi le denying their o w n . They are often 
the ones w h o are expected to, and who do, expend the 
energy i n mainta in ing the car ing relation between them-
selves and their male friend, lover, or spouse. Further, men 
are accustomed to responding to this care from women, i n 
the m i n i m a l sense described above. They f lourish, becom-
i n g more ful ly themselves and freely pursue their own 
projects; but, this w i l l not do. T h i s k i n d of asymmetry i n 
such caring relations is often what leads to low self-esteem 
i n women. It is reasonable to believe that men could learn 
to become capable of deeper responses, and further, if they 
likewise embrace the ethical ideal as stated above, they 
have a responsibility to endeavor to learn. 
In N o d d i n g s ' view, men are indeed required to learn 
how to care, yet there is noth ing to say that they ought to 
endeavor to care for the particular women from w h o m 
they receive care. Yet this is precisely what is needed. A n 
analysis of some of the car ing relations most central to the 
lives of women, such as those of friendship, w o u l d reveal 
that mutual i ty , where attainable, is desirable i n the sense 
of c o n f i r m i n g the self of particular women. Noddings 
r ightly claims there is something central to morali ty i n 
c o n f i r m i n g the reality and self-worth of individuals . M e n 
need to learn to conf i rm and value the women who care for 
them, not as mere extensions of the men themselves, but as 
persons i n their o w n right w i t h w h o m they are related in a 
certain way. R e q u i r i n g men to respond as one-caring 
toward the women who care for them w i l l , I believe, better 
ensure that women's caring does not contribute to women's 
subordination to men. If men care for the women who care 
for them i n the way that a one-caring should care, then 
men must conf irm such women i n a way which promotes 
the ethical selves of these women. T h e ethical self of a 
person requires a certain sort of autonomy. T h i s auton-
omy w i l l a l low women to be significantly independent 
of men. Just as pr ior relations and the individuals 
involved influence the types of feelings/thoughts to w h i c h 
the one-caring becomes attentive, so too, they influence 
the type of response w h i c h w i l l be acceptable, and in some 
instances, required, from the cared-for. 
There is a sense i n w h i c h patriarchal relations, and the 
value system at their base, may actually preclude, or at 
least make very diff icult , the possibility of relations 
becoming caring relations. T h e patriarchal value system 
gives rise to many attitudes antithetical to the caring atti-
tude. One such attitude is that of arrogance and it charac-
terizes the perspective of what M a r i l y n Frye has termed 
"the arrogant eye" 9 . T h e relation it typically accompanies 
is that w h i c h holds between oppressor and oppressed. T h e 
arrogant eye perceives the dist inct ion between a certain 
class of individuals (subjects) of w h i c h he is a member, and 
another class of individuals (objects) as simultaneously a 
dist inct ion between the superior and the inferior, respec-
tively. T h e arrogant eye is present i n most forms of oppres-
sive social relations, such as those w h i c h h o l d between 
differing economic classes, dif fering races, and differing 
genders. 
T h e arrogant eye perceives and defines "the other" as 
hav ing certain natures, desires, needs, and purposes i n 
terms of his (i.e., the arrogant eye's) o w n interests. So 
strong is this perception of the other, so accepted as "nor-
m a l " that eventually the other becomes what the oppres-
sor sees. Is this so for women? Patriarchal definitions of 
" w o m a n " abound i n pornography, in ideals of mother-
hood, i n ideals of feminini ty i n general. D o women them-
selves embrace these images, aspire to them, physical ly 
m o l d their bodies to them, and evaluate their self-worth on 
the basis of h o w close they come to these ideals? 
Undeniably . 
Indeed, the "se l f " of i n d i v i d u a l women arises i n large 
part from the patriarchal def in i t ion of what it means to be 
a w o m a n , of what it means to be a member of the class 
" w o m a n . " As a l l women, by def in i t ion , partake i n this 
class to one degree or another, a l l women share to one 
degree or another, i n the concept of "self" to w h i c h the 
def in i t ion of w o m a n gives rise. There is, then, considera-
ble overlap i n the selves of i n d i v i d u a l women. In advocat-
i n g a moral theory w h i c h places emphasis on the nature of 
selves, one must take into account the fact that pol i t i ca l 
factors contribute i n a fundamental way to the def in i t ion 
of such selves. 
A l t h o u g h the patriarchally defined w o m a n is adept at 
completely engrossing her self i n others (specifically men 
and children), this is not conducive to car ing as the one-
car ing should ( in N o d d i n g s ' view). T h e one-caring ought 
to engross herself i n the other only for a time. After she has 
"received" the other, the one-caring should return to her 
self, i n turn worthy of another's engrossment. T h e one-
car ing is an autonomous being, not i n the sense that 
masculinist theory employs this word, but more so i n the 
sense of dynamic autonomy as defined by Evelyn Fox 
Keller: 
D y n a m i c autonomy reflects a sense of self as both 
differentiated f rom and related to others, and a sense 
of others as subjects w i t h w h o m one shares enough 
to a l l o w for a recognition of their independent 
interests and feelings. In short, for a recognition of 
them as other subjects. 
. . . it gives rise to a sense of agency i n a w o r l d of 
interacting and interpersonal agents w i t h w h o m 
and w i t h w h i c h one feels an essential k insh ip , whi le 
st i l l recognizing and accepting, their independent 
integri ty. 1 0 
W o m e n as patriarchally defined are not autonomous i n 
this sense. They seem to lose their selves altogether. A 
woman's self is typical ly defined entirely i n terms of her 
relation to others. T h e i r aspirations, desires, interests, 
become her aspirations, desires and interests i n the sense 
that she lives to see their aspirations and desires fu l f i l l ed . 
In N o d d i n g s ' view, the one-caring has a pr ior commit -
ment to mainta in her o w n ethical self, to become the sort 
of person w h o can be genuinely one-caring. T h i s car ing 
for self warrants the one-caring's wi thdrawal of care i n 
order to redirect it towards herself, i n cases where there is a 
cont inued lack of response f rom the cared-for. I th ink that 
the not ion of dynamic autonomy and the role that this sort 
of autonomy plays i n m a k i n g one a moral/caring person 
is i m p l i c i t l y at work i n N o d d i n g s here. What also is 
i m p l i c i t l y at work i n N o d d i n g s ' view is my belief that i n 
certain car ing relations a lack of response of the appro-
priate k i n d , more specifically a lack of mutuali ty, can often 
serve to d i m i n i s h the one-caring's sense of self-worth. 
Further, I agree w i t h N o d d i n g s ' c l a i m that we have a pr ior 
commitment to mainta in o u r o w n ethical self, to become 
the sort of person w h o can be genuinely one-caring. Yet 
this commitment cannot be carried out utterly i n d i v i d u -
al ly . It is not solely a matter of reflecting u p o n one's "self" 
trying to determine ways i n w h i c h one could become a 
better car ing i n d i v i d u a l . T h i s self-reflection is important, 
but if one acquires aspects of one's self through being 
related to others, and through social definitions, then 
reflection o n these relations a n d definit ions is also neces-
sary. We need a proper balance between the concept of 
ourselves as distinct f rom others and as related to others. 
Fox Keller's def ini t ion of D y n a m i c A u t o n o m y is, I think, a 
good guide. 
In addit ion to i n d i v i d u a l women's commitment to their 
ethical selves, indeed because of it, I suggest that women 
likewise have a pr ior commitment to the selves of other 
women. T h a t is, women have an obl igat ion to contribute 
to the ab i l i ty of other w o m e n to become the sorts of i n d i -
viduals w h o are dynamical ly autonomous and w h o can 
truly care. T h i s obl igat ion is an extension of the pr ior 
obl igat ion w o m e n have to themselves, for a l l women 
share to some degree i n the same concept of self. Indeed, 
w o m e n have a moral ob l iga t ion to so care for other 
women, even at the risk of car ing less for others, viz, men 
and chi ldren, a l though car ing for these others is i m p o r -
tant as w e l l . If women are to care for others at a l l , they 
must first acquire a strong ethical self. In contr ibut ing to 
the strengthening of the ethical selves of other women, 
i n d i v i d u a l women likewise become stronger ethical selves. 
Such contr ibut ion may be evidenced through f o r m i n g 
personal car ing relations w i t h other women, but this is 
not always possible. Factors such as geographical distance 
between w o m e n and differences i n personalities can make 
relations dif f icult . Further there is a l i m i t to the amount of 
energy any given person can expend i n mainta in ing close 
relationships. Yet there are other ways i n w h i c h such a 
contr ibut ion may be made. One may endeavor to combat 
the various institutions of patriarchy, such as pornog-
raphy or wife-battering, w h i c h serve to undermine the 
ethical selves of a l l women. Combat ing these institutions 
may make it possible for women, for w h o m one cannot 
personally care, to enter caring relations w i t h others. In 
this way, the ethical ideal is enhanced. 
T h i s is one point where ethics and polit ics become 
inseparable. W h e n pol i t i ca l factors determine a def ini t ion 
of self incompatible w i t h the development of the ethical 
self of a person/group of persons, we have an ethical 
obl igat ion to dispose of those pol i t ica l factors and to create 
relations wherein the ethical selves of such individuals can 
be enhanced. S imi lar ly , indiv iduals w h o are themselves 
members of an oppressed group are moral ly justified i n 
c o m m i t t i n g themselves to caring for members of their 
group over nonmembers of their group and/or members 
of the oppressing group, by appeal to the ethical ideal and 
the concept of ethical self. 
Be ing the object of the arrogant eye makes it di f f icult for 
women to be truly one-caring. Yet, the arrogant eye makes 
it dif f icult for men to become one-caring as wel l , and 
especially towards women. T h e arrogant eye is incompat-
ible w i t h the eye of the one-caring. H o w c o u l d the reality 
of the other, the feelings, and experiences attain as m u c h 
import to the arrogant perceiver, even for a time, as his 
own? H o w could the arrogant eye possibly engross h i m -
self i n that other beneath him? Even if he could manage to 
be attentive to the other, his arrogance w o u l d hinder his 
abi l i ty to clearly see the true needs and desires of the other, 
for his arrogance defines the needs and desires of the other 
solely i n relation to this o w n . 
It may be claimed that if the socially defined self i n 
w h i c h a l l men partake is underdeveloped i n terms of being 
a truly ethical self, then o n my analysis men w o u l d be 
justified, indeed obligated, i n directing their attention 
towards themselves, to care first for each other. T h i s may 
be so. Yet, it is interesting to note that if men were to 
attempt to redefine their " S e l f ' i n keeping w i t h the ethical 
ideal, women w o u l d automatical ly benefit. Is it not 
obvious that i n redefining their male selves, a l l that was 
once defined solely i n relation to their patriarchally 
defined male selves w o u l d no longer be so defined. M e n 
w o u l d "care" for women, if only indirectly; but secondly, 
and most importantly, it is reasonable to believe that those 
w h o benefit most from oppressive social arrangements 
have a greater moral responsibility to rectify such arrange-
ments. If so, then given that the ethical selves of women 
are diminished because of patriarchal relations, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that men have a significant moral 
obl igat ion to dispose of patriarchy and to promote the 
ethical selves of women i n addit ion to, and even before, 
their o w n . It should be clear that our commitment to the 
ethical ideal and the caring relation entails that we dispose 
of the arrogant eye and any other patriarchal values w h i c h 
interfere w i t h the caring relation, and that we work 
towards strengthening the selves of women, and other 
oppressed people, if we are ever to become truly ones w h o 
care. 
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Circle Game 
It's not just family voices n o w 
chant ing over the wire, whisper ing expectations 
i n her solitary ear; it's not just her mother's eye 
that measures her hand when she brings a new m a n home. 
A t the reunion, family pictures were fanned 
i n the ringed fingers of o ld classmates 
and she was back against the g y m w a l l 
w a i t i n g to be picked, torn between a sport she didn ' t play 
and not want ing to be last. 
She's noticed a recent mannerism that has her twist ing 
the bare finger at night ; sometimes she wakes 
to scratched skin , wonders if she was h o l d i n g on 
or tearing off the dreamed circle. 
T h e mirror tells her it's nearly too late, and she finds men 
harder to meet, and the ones she does, harder to stand. 
But she has things to do, and solitude is a friend 
w h o asks no questions, doesn't cal l late at night 
w i t h a voice l ike whiskey, w a n t i n g to come over, 
doesn't need to talk right now 
about something she said last week. 
She goes her o w n way, unable to expla in her reasons for 
w a n t i n g 
her o w n way; entertains visits f rom o l d lovers 
that sometimes turn m a u d l i n . It seem everyone needs this 
more than she does. She knows she w i l l always be 
out of step, the odd one at parties, the one 
w h o knows more than most about deadbolts and tire 
changes, 
prefers to sit w i t h the men when talk turns to pregnancy 
but no more at home w i t h football . 
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